“Extraordinary Efforts”: What the EU’s 2025 Enlargement Package Report Means for Ukraine
On November 3, 2025, the European Commission, an executive branch of the European Union, released its annual Enlargement Package report. The report is a comprehensive evaluation of the progress of candidate countries to EU membership. This year’s report highlighted the candidacy of Ukraine, which has been engaged in full-scale conflict with Russia since February of 2022.
The report praised Ukraine’s “remarkable commitment” to reforms and its dedication to maintaining democratic institutions despite ongoing Russian invasion and bombardment. Yet, the conversation surrounding Ukraine has also delivered a sobering reminder that EU membership is contingent on fundamental, sustainable changes in governance and law. The Commission identified several persistent weaknesses in Ukrainian rule of law, judicial independence, and anti-corruption measures, warning that “more must be done” to meet the standards expected of any new member state. Specifically, the EU is referencing the limited independence of Ukraine’s judicial branch caused by undue political influence, and continuing corruption of the Prosecutor General’s office. The judiciary at large must not only surpass historic issues of corruption, but also advance through digitization–including virtual courts and online legal records–and increased judicial efficacy.
The report cited concerns over attempts by Ukraine’s leadership to expand the powers of the prosecutor general, a move that was later reversed amid public backlash. The Commission also stressed the need for greater transparency within Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions and better protection for civil society organizations. One often-cited example is Ukraine’s Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), which lacks the institutional autonomy and legitimate power to appropriately address government corruption. Similarly, Ukrainian civil society lacks the physical and digital security necessary to fully flourish. Despite these challenges, the Commission acknowledged Ukraine’s “extraordinary efforts under extraordinary circumstances.”
In response to the findings, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reaffirmed Ukraine’s goal of joining the EU before 2030. He called for swift membership action from the EU, rejecting what he described as “demi-membership” or symbolic inclusion in the European assembly of states. His statement echoes a sentiment shared by many Ukrainians: that the country’s future security, democracy, and prosperity depends on integration within the European community. In a survey conducted by EU Neighbours East, 70 percent of Ukrainians would vote to join the EU in a referendum. The top three reasons Ukrainians cited were for increased security, the EU’s strong condemnation of Russia’s invasion, and advanced economic opportunity for the nation.
The European Commission has also made clear that enlargement will not come at the cost of stability within the bloc. As the Financial Times reported, Brussels is developing new safeguards designed to prevent “Trojan horse,” countries that could undermine EU democratic norms post acceptance. This reflects lessons learned from past experiences with rule-of-law backsliding in existing member states such as Hungary and Poland. Both Poland and Hungary joined the EU in 2004 as part of the single largest enlargement in the institution’s history, a direct result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since that point, both countries have been harshly condemned for issues such as repeated electoral fraud and insufficient protections for civil society and liberties. Similarly to Ukraine, Poland’s backsliding was centered around its judiciary, which lacked independence and sought to challenge EU law.
After gaining independence in 1991, Ukrainian leaders sought to balance ties between Russia and the West, treading the line between economic dependency on Moscow and a growing need for European identity to differentiate themselves from Russia. In the early 2000s, this balance tipped decisively toward European identity with the Orange Revolution of 2004. What began as a mass movement against electoral fraud grew into a decisive democratic shift. In the runoff election, the official results declared the pro-Kremlin candidate Viktor Yanukovych the winner, but his opponent, the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko, his supporters, and international observers accused the election of being rigged. The demonstrators’ rallying cry,“Ukraine is Europe,” captured the growing belief that the country belonged within the Western democratic order.
Yet conflicting interests still lingered within Ukraine, when then-president Viktor Yanukovych abruptly suspended preparations for a 2013 EU Association Agreement in pursuit of Russian economic ties. This decision ignited the Euromaidan protests, a nationwide uprising that led to Yanukovych’s ousting and Ukraine’s solidified pro-Western European pivot. The following year, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was signed, solidifying a new era of political and economic integration through trade, reforms, and legislative alignment. This agreement solidified deeper Ukraine-EU ties, and pushed Ukraine further towards full membership.
The Enlargement Package Report represents both recognition and restraint from the EU in terms of Ukraine. It acknowledges Ukraine’s extraordinary progress under extreme duress, but warns that membership will still require years of sustained reform from the country. Ukraine’s government continues to insist that reforms are advancing as quickly as wartime conditions allow. As Brussels debates the mechanics of accession, the larger question may not be if Ukraine joins the EU, but how and when Europe can adapt itself to welcome a member forged through war and resilience.