Uzbekistan’s Nuclear Future and Its Changing Relationship with Russia
Uzbekistan has launched construction of its first nuclear power plant in June 2026, in partnership with Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation. However, Uzbekistan’s growing reliance on Russian energy and technology contrasts with the government’s newly stated goal of localization for the project. Rather than choosing between Moscow and other foreign partners, the government is deepening its ties with Russia while pursuing local-content targets, expanding technical oversight, and seeking new partnerships in the project. The result can be described as hedging: Uzbekistan relies on Russian energy and technology, but is working to diversify its contracts and avoid relying on Russia alone.
The project’s first months already show this balance. On June 4, workers from Rosatom and Uzatom carried out a ceremonial concrete pour to mark the start of construction. The plant will include two VVER-1000 reactors and two small modular reactors, for a total power output of 2.1 gigawatts. On September 2, the government released an update on the project, this time requiring much greater Uzbek participation and more independent technical supervision of the nuclear project. In less than three months, Uzbekistan was already revising the terms of its Russian-built plant, which suggests it wants a larger say in the project, not a complete break from Russia.
The project has been developing for many years, reflecting ongoing technical cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan. In 2018, Uzatom and Rosatom signed an agreement to train personnel for the country’s nuclear industry to support preparation for this integrated nuclear power plant. These ties continued as the project has advanced. In 2024, Rosatom and Uzbekistan’s Atomic Energy Agency signed an export contract for construction, the world’s first export contract for building an advanced small-scale nuclear power plant. In 2025, a supplemental agreement revised the plans and expanded the project to include the two larger reactors alongside the two smaller ones. A year later, Rosatom hosted its first internship for Uzbek specialists, teaching them how to design, equip, and operate the country’s first nuclear power plant. This history shows how deeply Russia is embedded in the project: after years of shared contracts and training, reducing dependence means working within an existing partnership rather than replacing it. But a long partnership did not mean Uzbekistan wanted exclusivity.
Following its independence in 1991, Uzbekistan did not stay closely aligned with Moscow. Under former President Islam Karimov, the country often sought to maintain some distance from Russia to preserve foreign policy freedom. Karimov’s government showed this by joining the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, then withdrawing in 2012, and by never joining the Eurasian Economic Union. Independence then meant distance. Under the current president, Mirziyoyev, it means choice: Uzbekistan has drawn much closer to Russia while working to ensure it does not rely on Russia alone.
President Mirziyoyev is trying to reduce the project’s dependence on Russia because he considers his country’s role in the project too small. In September, his office reported that local production accounts for only 21 percent of the project’s value, which he called insufficient. He is advocating for localization and has set a target of at least 30 percent of production to be carried out domestically, 65 percent of construction designated to national enterprises, and 7,000 local workers and specialists to run the plant. The plan also includes two 200-hectare zones for employee housing and an industrial area with 100 joint ventures to speed up localization. These targets matter less for the numbers than for what they signal, which is Uzbekistan’s desire to be a builder of the plant, not just a buyer of Russian technology.
Financing is still an open question. The plant is expected to cost $9.5 billion, leaving Uzbekistan negotiating not only how much of the project will be carried out domestically, but also how it will be paid for. Uzatom expects external borrowing to cover around 90 percent of the project, and has said it is considering funding from the BRICS New Development Bank, international financial institutions, and potentially Russia. This means Uzbekistan cannot pay for the plant on its own, so its independence lies in keeping the choice of lender open. The question is unsettled for more than one reason: Tashkent has not approved Russia’s proposed plan, and the broader mix of domestic, foreign, and Russian funding has not been decided.
As Uzbekistan’s economy develops and electricity demand rises, it will need more sustainable energy sources, which is why it has turned to nuclear energy. Nuclear energy is seen as a critical transitional bridge because it has zero emissions during operations, high reliability, and grid stability. In Uzbekistan’s electricity sector—which depends on imports from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—the nuclear plant is planned to supply 15 percent of total electricity generation, reducing the gas share to roughly 61 percent. Although Russia’s involvement has addressed Uzbekistan’s energy-security problems, it has also introduced a new kind of dependence. Unlike pipeline gas delivery, a nuclear power plant requires a very long timeline of specialized maintenance, operator training, and technical expertise that remains tied to the reactor supplier. For this reason, Uzbekistan’s push to build domestic capacity while securing foreign expertise is particularly important as it proceeds with Russia to build the plant.
Efforts to reduce reliance on a single partner have now moved beyond the construction site. On September 17, Uzbekistan entered into an agreement with Turkey on nuclear and radiation safety, covering specialist training, technical expertise, and research. The country also met with experts from Finland and Russia, making a deliberate effort to draw on regulatory knowledge from different systems rather than completely rejecting Russian expertise. Days before these meetings, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić said Mirziyoyev told him Uzbekistan intended to build a second nuclear project with China. This has not been formally confirmed yet. These developments suggest Uzbekistan is not replacing Russia with a single new partner; instead, Tashkent appears to be increasing the number of countries that can provide nuclear technology and expertise.
Greater diversification of nuclear energy does not automatically mean a broader economic departure from Moscow. Before Mirziyoyev expressed his wish for greater localization and more stringent oversight, he met Putin in Bishkek to discuss growing trade and investment between the two countries, noting that bilateral trade has increased by 12 percent since the start of 2026. Uzbekistan thus seems to be maintaining close economic ties with Russia while trying to avoid becoming overly reliant on Russian technology, energy, and expertise.
Multiple geopolitical factors have changed Russia’s own position. Its long-established European gas market has shrunk considerably, with pipeline exports dropping by 44% in 2025, reaching their lowest level since the mid-1970s. The war in Ukraine has reinforced this loss of influence. In response, energy exports to and from China have increased as Moscow is redirecting trade eastward. In March 2026, rising oil and gas prices, driven by disturbances in the Middle East, spurred a surge in demand for Russian supplies. Yet this will not restore the European market Russia once had. In turn, Russia’s interest in Central Asia fits into its broader search for new markets.
As a result, countries like Uzbekistan matter to Russia not only as political allies, but also as energy customers. Major joint projects continue in energy, industry, and transport, making this relationship increasingly important to both sides. However, Uzbekistan has demonstrated some ability to negotiate the terms of its growing dependence on Russia. In 2022, Uzbekistan rejected Moscow’s proposed trilateral gas union and insisted that Russian gas be purchased through commercial contracts without political conditions. Now, Moscow benefits even more from Uzbek demand amid its reduced presence in the EU market. This has given Uzbekistan the opportunity to push for local jobs, technology transfer, and external oversight without leaving Russia entirely. Uzbekistan must walk a fine line: not dictating terms but finding openings to negotiate them.
Uzbekistan still depends on Russia for technological assistance, energy supplies, and trade, while working to ensure this dependence does not become exclusive. The fact that Uzbekistan is pursuing localization, establishing independent oversight, and forming new ties with countries such as Turkey indicates its aim is not to abandon Moscow but to create enough alternatives to buttress its position when negotiating the terms of its nuclear project.