Conferences over Chinese bombs in the Pacific Ocean go bust
On September 3, two months after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) tested a Julang ballistic missile in the Pacific Ocean, a summit of regional actors came together in Palau to discuss a course of action. The summit resulted in no condemnation of the intense military exercise, raising worries about growing political division and a geopolitical shift away from the West. The summit included major Pacific players, such as Australia, as well as smaller regional nations like Palau, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Kiribati. In recent years, the relevance of these typically overlooked players has become much more apparent as China, looking to expand its military capability, seeks to further incorporate the Pacific as an essential theatre in its sphere of influence.
An explosive start
The military exercise sparking the discussion took place on July 6, 2026, and was announced by China’s official news agency, Xinhua News, the same day. Though the report divulged no information about the missile's launch or destination, the Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council posted a graphic on X showing the missile’s speculated flight path. The image shows the missile flying close to several Pacific countries, with the test missile likely being a Julang-2 (JL-2) or Julang-3 (JL-3) missile fired from a nuclear-powered submarine.
The JL-2 and JL-3 are both intercontinental ballistic missiles, with the JL-3 having an extended range long enough to reach the continental United States from waters close to mainland China, crossing over the Pacific. Taiwan’s military agencies claimed the missile was likely to be a JL-2 based on its flight path. However, scholars from the United States, as well as Sr. Colonel Zhang Junshe at China’s Naval Research Institute, saw it differently. The test, according to Zhang’s comments to a Chinese publication, acted as an attempt for China to continue “strengthening its nuclear deterrent,” allowing the rising power to “defend its national interests on its own terms,” without interference.
The oceanic response
With Pacific nations gripped by concern over the possibility that the Pacific could be placed between two of the world’s greatest military powers as a result of China’s military expansion, the urgency to respond to the military exercise quickly appeared throughout Oceania.
Countries rushed to issue statements condemning China’s actions, with the Foreign Ministers of Australia and New Zealand expressing concern over the short notice of the exercise, receiving notification only a few hours before launch. Among Pacific Island nations, however, the response was much more restrained. Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, Matthew Wale, had previously been known for taking harsh stances against Chinese military involvement in Oceania. However, at the summit, Wale insisted that China was a “good friend” to the Solomon Islands, which had merely stepped too far into unwelcome territory with its unanticipated exercise. Fiji, despite signing a defense pact with Australia the same day as the missile test, assured that it was “friends to all,” refraining from any harsh condemnation even while actively moving in opposition to the PRC’s military interests.
China, meanwhile, remained adamant that its military tests in the Pacific were of no concern. Preemptively rejecting fears of hostility among the international community, Xinhua News released a statement the day of the launch insisting that the test was conducted with “prior notification” and was not “targeted at any specific country.” Later that same day, upon questioning from Japanese and European reporters, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning doubled down on China’s claimed position of non-hostility by reiterating that the launch was “consistent with international law,” with Ning requesting that “relevant countries” not “read too much” into the intentions of the exercise.
The Pacific plan of action
Despite China’s reassurance, claims of non-aggression from the PRC did little to quell fears of expanding Chinese military presence among the Pacific’s leaders. One month following the launch, eighteen Pacific countries met to discuss responses to China’s activity in the region, namely the July exercise. The forum began by presenting a resounding show of disapproval against Chinese military action. Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Minister called China’s actions “totally inappropriate,” while conference chair Rick Houenipwela, the Foreign Minister for the Solomon Islands, demanded that the Pacific’s future and affairs be “shaped by the Pacific, and only the Pacific.”
However, despite their efforts, Pacific nations were unable to unanimously present any statement responding to China’s military exercise that had “destabilized” the region just a month prior.
Speaking with the press following the meeting, New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Winston Peters, expressed his disappointment with “two countries,” alleged to be Kiribati and Naoero. Peters said both countries had referred to the desires of an “outside partner,” likely China—which both have become increasingly friendly with. Having chosen to recognize the PRC in 2019 and 2024, their shift, combined with the suspicion they attracted from other Pacific states during the meeting, demonstrated a significant political divide in the region.
The PIF eventually returned to China’s military tests at their retreat in Palau in early September. However, the discourse quickly devolved into a standoff between Naoero and the returning members of the forum, as Naoero refused to endorse any statement of concern regarding China’s missile test.
In addition to Naoero’s rejection, the heads of state of five invited states were not present. These absences, especially in Palau, which had recently asked to form a “united front” against China’s missile test, collectively signaled to many a sign of fear in the face of Beijing’s growing presence in the Pacific.
Though the forum typically expects that statements be supported unanimously, New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Christopher Luxon, attempted to alleviate concerns by insisting that the actions of one member, such as Naoero, were “no reason” for the forum to be unable to present a “consensus position” that captured the sentiments of the Pacific Island Forum as a whole. Others, meanwhile, saw the inability to issue a unanimous agreement as a warning sign of a major rift growing within the Pacific.
Rocky waters ahead in the Pacific?
Pacific island nations are unique in that their issues are not only visibly existential, but threaten to literally wipe them off the map, as issues like rising sea levels hold catastrophic risks that other countries can avoid. Consequently, Pacific nations seek help wherever they can receive it—placing a roadblock in the West’s pathway to its goal of preventing Chinese expansion in the Pacific and beyond. As China supplies Oceania with resources to prevent climate change and bankrolls the development of infrastructure throughout the region, the friendships that Western countries once took for granted may quickly slip away.
Dominated by Western powers for centuries, Oceania has suddenly arrived at the doorstep of the world’s new superpower. With each side standing to greatly benefit from an increased political presence in Oceania, both China and the West work to carefully woo the Pacific into their sphere of influence. Though the West has been more transparent, openly making deals surrounding military strategy, such as the defense pact brokered between Fiji and Australia, China has had to work subtly to avoid suspicion, attempting to garner support from the Pacific in exchange for upgrades to everything from roads to schools. For now, China has kept its word in helping the Pacific—at least for as long as those Pacific nations carry their end of the bargain.
However, this provides Oceania with a dangerous balance to manage.
Aligning with either the West or China can come at the cost of the other’s support, a burden many Oceanic countries cannot afford. For this reason, a mantra like Fiji’s—to treat every country as a “friend,” goes beyond basic peacekeeping; it's a lifeline. Therefore, unless the West can provide a better lifeline for the issues eating away at the Pacific, its relationship with the region that has become one of China’s most desired pathways into global military dominance could be resigned to the same fate many Oceanic nations resist today: to be eroded and washed from existence.