Threats to Chadian Stability in the Sahel

Africa’s Sahel region spans the expanse between the Northern desert and fertile South–– encompassing many of the continent's fastest-growing populations and some of the most abundant territories in terms of natural resources and human capital. Yet, political instability, combined with the effects of chronic hunger and climate change, have effectively prohibited the region from building the fundamental infrastructure that it needs to achieve long-term prosperity. Democratically elected governments in the Sahel, unable to deliver on campaign promises, struggle to retain power. In the absence of governmental legitimacy, the Sahel’s potential for growth often becomes the basis of its vulnerability–– initiating a cyclical process between the fall of stability and the spread of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, al-Qaeda, and ISIS-West Africa. In the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP)  Journey to Extremism report, 25% of former, and some current, African extremists interviewed noted employment opportunities as their primary reason for joining. Only 17% cited religion, and less than 10% total attributed their voluntary affiliation to either political or ethnic principles. Despite their association with ideological extremism, terrorist group recruitment efforts in the Sahel are often fueled by poor economic conditions and underlying political fragility. 

The magnitude and ferocity of terrorist operations in the Sahel has drawn considerable regional and international attention over the last few decades. In 2014, the Global Terrorism Index accredited Boko Haram for the two deadliest terrorist attacks of that year, responsible for  just over 250 combined fatalities. That same year, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad formed the G5 Sahel military alliance, marking a newfound commitment to collectively combating terrorism in the region. Hoping to bolster the strength of this fledgling coalition, France soon began supplying several thousand troops to the region for counterterrorism operations. The Sahel appeared to be making headway towards a more stable future under a new system of multilateral security efforts. 

From a U.S. perspective, the Sahel’s security developments were crucial to thwarting terrorism abroad with a reduced military signature on the ground. Chad in particular became a quasi-strategic partner to the U.S., serving as a lynchpin to stability in the Sahel despite its own track record of dictatorial rule and ruthless suppression of opposition. Chad’s iron-fisted regime, defined by former President Idriss Déby, provided the region, and international allies, with the type of military stability it needed. Déby notoriously bolstered the strength of his army with finances that many argue belonged to improving the wellbeing of Chad’s populace. Déby’s commitment to sacrificing Chadian troops for broader Sahelian strength garnered massive economic support from the U.S. and France and further advanced Chad’s reputability in spite of lingering internal concerns. But with Déby’s unexpected death in 2021, followed by worsening security situations in neighboring countries like Sudan, the cornerstone of modern Sahelian unity appeared to be on the brink.

Recent developments in the Sahel point to a somewhat expected unraveling of the region’s aforementioned steps towards stability, and a confirmation of the fears of foreign allies. Idriss Déby’s son, Mahamat Déby, assumed de facto control of Chad in 2021 but currently faces significant internal opposition. His own weakening position is further threatened by the demise of Sahelian democracy and multilateral cooperation. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all been overrun by military coups over the past three years. Each country has also chosen to abandon collective counterterrorism efforts under the G5 Sahel. As of early September, former-members opted to create a new mutual security pact, dubbed the “Alliance of Sahel States,” with the goal of maintaining the integrity of participants’ ruling military juntas through mutual defense, and notably excluding Chad. The imperfect yet effective Sahelian order that had operated since 2014 is now at an increased risk of failing. 

As regional and international efforts fall short of saving the Sahel from a familiar cycle of destruction, the phrase “African solutions to African problems” regains a new sense of relevance. Only this time, the prospect of losing Chadian stability raises the stakes for finding a solution. If Déby’s son falls to external aggression in the wake of the G5’s demise, the cost of regaining control of the Sahel is likely to far exceed any prior levels. Amid both domestic and regional turmoil, the flow of allied military support to Chad has already declined as France and its EU partners reevaluate their grand strategies and wrestle with their colonial legacies. Without most of the backstops that prevented the region’s collapse just under a decade ago, Chad now finds itself relatively alone in the Sahel–– leaving the door open for young Déby to determine the country’s path forward amidst renewed Sahelian instability.