Shaping Cyberspace: The Influence of China’s Digital Silk Road
Since its launch in 2015, China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) has evolved into more than an economic project; it is a strategy of digital statecraft aimed at reshaping global connectivity. Through investments in fiber-optic cables, 5G networks, and cloud computing, Beijing effectively promotes a vision of cyberspace that privileges sovereignty and state control. In doing so, China not only builds infrastructure but also fosters political dependencies, influencing the way digital norms are defined across regions from Europe to Southeast Asia. China has carefully framed the DSR as inclusive and mutually beneficial. Four themes dominate its official discourse: connectivity, the digital economy, international cooperation, and cyberspace geopolitics. Each seems benign but carries normative weight.
By emphasizing connectivity, Chinese officials promote not just undersea cables but also a “community of shared destiny in hyperspace.” This framing masks power asymmetries by presenting China as a benevolent partner. Ilaria Carrozza, author of Discourse and Norms along China’s Digital Silk Road, claims that these narratives grant Beijing both “the right to speak” and the “power to be heard,” embedding Chinese notions of cyber governance in ways that appear consensual but serve its strategic aims. Material projects reinforce these narratives. Chinese companies have laid submarine cables connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa while installing terrestrial fiber across Belt and Road corridors. In Laos, the China-Indochina Peninsula Railway was paired with Chinese telecom systems, binding physical and digital connectivity together.
The digital economy provides another layer: Alibaba’s eWTP hub in Malaysia and the spread of apps like WeChat embed local economies into Chinese platforms, deepening reliance. The standards for these infrastructures amplify this influence as well—for instance, through initiatives like China Standards 2035, Beijing seeks to shape the technical foundations of communication systems, potentially locking states into its ecosystem for decades to come. The 2017 Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China reinforced requirements for data storage and flow, nudging partners toward a governance model that blends development with surveillance. Authoritarian governments in Southeast Asia (e.g., Cambodia and Myanmar) find this model especially appealing. For others, however, it risks undermining sovereignty and resilience.
International cooperation is the narrative that allows China to present the DSR as a mutually beneficial enterprise, yet the varied responses of Europe, Japan, and smaller states reveal how this narrative often masks deep asymmetries and the risk of dependence. The European Union has become increasingly aware of these threats. A report on European security perspectives emphasizes that connectivity, once seen as a neutral enabler of prosperity, is now viewed as a vector of vulnerability. Chinese investments in ports, energy grids, and especially digital infrastructure have prompted the EU to tighten procurement rules on 5G and strengthen foreign investment screening. The concern is not immediate dominance but gradual dependence, which could expose critical infrastructure to coercion. This reframing of connectivity, as both opportunity and risk, underscores what is truly at stake.
In the Indo-Pacific, however, responses differ drastically. Japan has chosen to compete by offering alternatives (e.g., infrastructure, standards, and regional connectivity projects) rather than confronting Beijing directly. The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision emphasizes cybersecurity and resilient supply chains, and Japanese telecommunication firms have excluded Huawei and ZTE from 5G networks. Government-backed submarine cable projects linking Japan to Guam and Australia further reduce reliance on Chinese systems. This strategy of competition without direct conflict acknowledges the need for cooperation while effectively managing the risks. Meanwhile, other nations’ approaches remain mixed. For instance, Vietnam rejected Huawei in its 5G rollout but remains cautious in balancing ties with Beijing. Smaller states often embrace Chinese infrastructure because it is rapidly deployed, gaining immediate connectivity and economic benefits despite potential vulnerabilities to dependency. This clearly illustrates that while China has successfully advanced its model of digital sovereignty through the DSR, other states continue to push back. Regional agency remains significant, and the ultimate shape of the digital order in Southeast Asia and beyond will depend on whether states prioritize short-term economic gains over long-term strategy.
Cyberspace geopolitics is where the stakes of the DSR become most apparent, as digital infrastructure shifts from being viewed as a neutral good to a contested domain of strategic competition. In light of China’s investments, normative campaigns, and the reactions of other states, the DSR functions as digital statecraft. It is simultaneously an economic development program, a normative campaign for cyber sovereignty and security, and a geopolitical instrument. Its effectiveness comes from linking discourse, infrastructure, and standards; however, its vulnerabilities are also clear: the more overt its influence, the more states mobilize countermeasures. Europe’s regulatory shifts and Japan’s infrastructure investments show that democracies are crafting their own models of secure connectivity. Therefore, it is fair to assume that the implications for global order are substantial. If the DSR continues unchecked, it risks entrenching a digital sphere shaped by authoritarian norms and structural dependence. However, if Europe, Japan, Southeast Asia, and other democratic coalitions succeed in building alternatives, there is a possibility for a more pluralistic digital order to emerge. Such an outcome would not eliminate the DSR but rather situate it as one pole among many, necessitating negotiation instead of dominance.
Ultimately, the Digital Silk Road is not just about technology—it is about power, sovereignty, and the rules of the digital economy. States engaging with it must realize they are buying into a governance system with potential far-reaching consequences. The challenge is to ensure that short-term infrastructure gains do not undermine long-term autonomy. Whether through regulation, investment in alternatives, or regional cooperation, the task ahead is to preserve a digital future—one that remains open, resilient, and free from undue dependence.