From War to Governance: The Struggle to Build a New Syrian State

The collapse of Syria’s regime was not a sudden revolution but a gradual unraveling of societal collapse that began with the Arab Spring. What started as a call for government reform against corruption, repression, and economic inequality led to 14 costly years of civil war, leaving behind a landscape defined by physical destruction, fractured authority, and millions of refugees scattered across continents. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 marked not only the end of a 50-year authoritarian regime but the beginning of an unprecedented effort to rebuild political order from institutional ruin. The new transitional government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa —a former al-Qaeda member and now a member of the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham faction— faces the monumental task of reconstructing a nation while grappling with weak institutions, underdeveloped infrastructure, and limited public trust. After years of civil conflict, Syria faces a new dilemma: how will it dismantle the Assad regime’s legacies, rebuild public trust, and reintegrate the country into the international community now that sanctions have been lifted? Reconstructing the state will require rebuilding Syria from “securing electricity, rebuilding shattered infrastructure, creating jobs, and ensuring access to basic necessities.”

For over fifty years, the Assad regime maintained power through a centralized security apparatus and a patronage-based bureaucracy. Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite air force officer from Syria’s religious minority, seized power from Ba'ath Party factions in the 1970 coup, and served as the President of Syria from 1971 until his death in 2000. His son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed power afterward, and, unlike his predecessor, fused the Ba’ath party, military, and bureaucracy into a single mechanism of control. Political dissent was heavily suppressed through an emboldened security apparatus, while loyalty to the regime was rewarded with economic favors and elite appointments. This architecture, plagued by corruption due to these patronage networks, hollowed out the state’s administrative core. Independent institutions, such as the court and parliamentary system, were replaced by personalized power networks. The regime’s reliance on sectarian and familial affiliation created a fragile political system. 

The Arab Spring protests erupted between 2010 and 2011, sparking pro-democracy uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa. In Syria, what began as a peaceful movement against the country’s government and President Bashar al-Assad turned into a militarized rebellion.  The state’s capacity to reform or absorb dissent had already eroded. Protesters who demanded the fall of the regime were met with extreme state violence, including the use of chemical weapons, which drew widespread condemnation from the United Nations and international entities. Ultimately, the cost of speaking out against the government led to half a million Syrian citizens losing their lives, and more than 14 million being displaced. 

Between 2011 and 2024, Syria transformed from a centralized state into a patchwork of competing factions. What began as an uprising quickly evolved into a multifront civil war. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) fractured into rival factions, leading to ISIS emerging and briefly establishing a proto-state. Shortly after, Kurdish forces consolidated autonomy in the northeast under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Foreign intervention exacerbated the conflict: Iran and Hezbollah equipped Shi’a and other militias in Syria by training and supplying them with weapons. Russia provided airpower and diplomatic backing to the Syrian government under President Bashar al-Assad, while Turkey occupied Syrian border zones to contain Kurdish influence. By the mid-2020s, Syria was effectively partitioned into different factions competing for political dominance. The human toll was immeasurable, making it increasingly difficult for any future government to not just rebuild its infrastructure, but also to establish a coherent national identity.

By mid-2024, Assad’s rule was devastated under the weight of economic collapse, elite fragmentation, and declining foreign support. Years of sanctions, currency freefall, and resource exhaustion had drained the states’ finances. Russia, facing its own geopolitical and economic strains stemming from its invasion of Ukraine, began withdrawing key supplies, signaling an end to the Assad regime’s sustained external protection. Assad’s resignation in December 2024 as a result of losing Russia’s military and financial backing marked the formal collapse of the regime. In its place, a National Transitional Council (NTC) was established under Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. With an over 81 percent approval rate of Sharaa's rule, Syrians believe he can unite opposition groups and bring stability after Assad’s fall. Backed by the Arab League and cautiously recognized by Western governments, the NTC assumed control with a limited mandate. The NTC’s main objective is to restore security through disarming militias, reforming security institutions, and rebuilding a unified national army, alongside drafting a new constitution and hosting elections by 2026. However, gaining legitimacy remains a challenge. The transitional government represents a coalition of former adversaries, including regime technocrats, Kurdish delegates, and opposition leaders drawn largely from Sunni-majority factions of the former Syrian National Coalition and moderate elements of the Free Syrian Army. Years of foreign intervention—by Iran and Hezbollah supporting the former regime, Russia’s military involvement, Turkey’s control of northern border zones, and U.S. operations against ISIS—have entrenched public mistrust. Many Syrians, therefore, view the NTC’s emergence under Arab and Western sponsorship as another externally engineered project rather than a sovereign national transition. The transition thus unfolds under immense pressure: to demonstrate sovereignty, prevent renewed conflict, and deliver visible reform amid persistent instability.

The consequences of Syria’s war extend far beyond its borders. Lebanon, Jordan, and Türkiye together host millions of Syrian refugees, placing immense strain on their social systems and reshaping domestic policies. In Lebanon alone, approximately 814,715 Syrians reside within a fragile state already facing economic collapse, fueling widespread resentment among the local communities. Turkey, grappling with economic downturn and shifting nationalist policies, has tightened border controls while negotiating selective returns under bilateral agreements with the NTC. Infrastructure in many areas of Syria has been effectively destroyed, with weak security forces unable to restore order in the country. The transitional government has prioritized refugee return as both a humanitarian and a legitimacy issue, arguing that reintegration of displaced citizens is central to national recovery. Yet successful return depends on reconstruction funding, legal reforms, and international confidence–all of which remain tentative. These regional dynamics will shape not only Syria’s domestic recovery but also its diplomatic reintegration.

The survival of Syria’s transitional government rests on three interdependent pillars: governance, security, and economy. Efforts are underway to establish a more decentralized political system, empowering local councils and provincial administrations. The constitutional committee began drafting a framework of centralized authority to integrate Kurdish and other minority representation into the political system without undermining national unity. However, endemic corruption and administrative decay continue to obstruct reform. A core priority is the integration of armed factions into unified security structures. The demobilization of militias remains uneven, complicated by external military presences, notably by the Iranian and Turkish forces. Without a credible national defense apparatus, the risk of renewed insurgencies or partition remains high. Syria’s economy is profoundly vulnerable, which necessitates colossal external funding for reconstruction. However, this international aid is directly tied to political conditions. Gulf states and the EU have pledged financial assistance, contingent on governance benchmarks such as publishing transparent, credible, and impartial investigations for all perpetrators of grave violations of international humanitarian law. Currency stabilization, infrastructure rebuilding, and sanctions relief negotiations dominate the transitional agenda, though much of the informal wartime economy still operates outside state control.

Regionally, the Sharaa government has pursued a balanced diplomatic strategy. Syria was readmitted to the Arab League in early 2025 and has reopened embassies with Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE, signaling a gradual normalization within the Arab system. Western engagement remains limited to the United States, France, and the United Kingdom– primarily focusing on humanitarian aid. Balancing these competing external pressures while attracting reconstruction support from Gulf and Western donors will determine whether post-Assad Syria can act as a truly independent state or remain a proxy within broader regional rivalries.

Syria stands at a fragile crossroads between collapse and renewal. The regime that defined its history for over fifty years has fallen, yet the structures needed to replace it are still emerging. The next few years will determine whether the country consolidates into a stable political system or regresses to a systematic and pervasive nation. The challenge for Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government is not simply reconstruction, but redefining the trajectory of the Syrian state as it transitions away from the Assad legacy.