Linguistic Sovereignty and the Remnants of Empire: Russian Language in Post-Soviet States
Although often overshadowed in political discourse, linguistics plays a fundamental role in geopolitics as an instrument of power and a symbol of identity. Throughout history, Moscow has used linguistic policy as an imperialistic tool to assert dominance over populations and continues to shape regional dynamics today. The Russian language is deeply embedded in Eastern Europe and Central Asia’s historical, cultural, and political identity. While Russia does not have direct dominion over many of its former territories, its influence persists over the region through the linguistic legacies of the empire. In the post-Soviet geopolitical landscape, languages play a crucial role as a unifying force or a source of tension in constructing and maintaining nation-states.
In 1922, the newly formed Soviet Union faced regulatory difficulties from governing more than 90 ethnic groups speaking over 130 languages. The multinational and multilingual state proved challenging to regulate, motivating the Bolsheviks to implement a national language: Russian. The Russian language became a primary tool in consolidating the expansive Soviet Socialist Republic. The unique dialects of the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Baltic states, and Siberia were suppressed through Russification, a form of linguistic imperialism. Throughout the Soviet industrialization in the 1920s and ‘30s, Russian became the ‘lingua franca’ of the region. For ethnic minorities such as Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians, fluency became a requirement for higher education and socioeconomic mobility, contributing to a growing resentment against their Russian oppressors.
Not until the collapse of the Communist Party in 1991 did the Soviet Union grant linguistic minorities the freedom to speak and, more importantly, to teach their languages in schools. Efforts in many Baltic and Caucasus nations emerged to reassert local linguistic identities. Over the next decade, cities such as Kharkiv, an eastern region of Ukraine, renamed hundreds of Soviet-era streets, demolished Soviet monuments, and replaced countless Russian books with their Ukrainian equivalents. Today, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan are the only former satellite states where Russian remains one of the official languages, along with Belarusian, Kyrgyz, and Kazakh, respectively. Russian is also an unofficial language in Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan because of their remaining significant Russian minority populations.
De-russification efforts often left Russian minorities feeling threatened and excluded from public spaces. Growing discrimination of these Russian minorities has ignited grassroots resistance and cultural resurgence across the satellite states. According to a 2001 census, in post-independence Ukraine, Russians accounted for 17.3 percent of the population, with 34 percent of the nation still speaking Russian regularly. Many of these Russian speakers are concentrated in Crimea, where over two-thirds of the population consists of ethnic Russians who claim Russian as their first language. Crimea exemplifies the growing tensions between the reclaiming of historical linguistic identities and threatened ethnic minorities. Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and persistent Russian military aggression and occupation in regions of Ukraine, the nation intensified efforts to reinforce its national identity.
In 2019, under the guise of national security, former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a state language law requiring Ukrainian to be used in most aspects of public life. The state language provision requires Ukrainians in government, medical, and educational settings and obligates every citizen to speak the language proficiently. Russia perceived this law as a failure to protect its ethnic minority, and it was a turning point for internal divisions in the region. The Kremlin cited Russophobia as furthering the linguistic divide and suppression of national identity. In 2021, at Moscow’s parade for the 76th anniversary of victory in World War II, President Vladimir Putin accused the West of “fueling regional conflicts, inter-ethnic and inter-religious strife, and trying to contain sovereign and independent centers of global development.” Putin followed by hailing the troops fighting in Ukraine and denouncing the return of Russiaphobia, continuing that “Russia will firmly defend our national interests to ensure the safety of our people.”
At the heel of waning Russian influence on its former republic, Russia has recently shifted its focus to more subtle instruments of influence, to linguistic nationalism. Soft power institutions like the Russkiy Mir Foundation have emerged to promote the Russian language in its ‘near abroad.’ Near abroad refers to the former Soviet satellite states viewed in Russian political discourse as having maintained significant ties with the Kremlin after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Russkiy Mir Foundation, created by Vladimir Putin in 2007, operates to spread the Russian language and culture across Eurasia. The ideology of Russkiy Mir, meaning “the Russian world,” has been used for centuries to define the proclaimed Russian diaspora empire. Fears of Russophobia eradicating Russian presence throughout Europe have manifested in these efforts to preserve the language and culture. Expanding higher education systems in Central Asia and fostering language development in Africa have been part of Moscow’s plans to counteract its diminishing global influence, modeled after the success of the Russian language unifying identity across borders in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Their plan for cultural and diplomatic initiatives to strengthen Russian control has continued through investment in media, education, and literature.
Despite the Kremlin’s efforts, younger generations in Baltic and Central Asian nations demonstrate a shift away from the Russian language and culture. The increasing recognition of native tongues and the dominance of American media have lessened Russian dominance. Over the past two decades, the population of English speakers in Estonia has doubled to 48 percent; meanwhile, the population of Russian speakers has decreased from 44 percent to 39 percent, according to a 2021 census. Policies adopted in Latvia, Estonia, and Uzbekistan towards monolingual education furthered the trends toward a non-Russian-speaking youth population. For example, in early 2024, the Estonian government switched to a unified Estonian-language education system, ending the financing of Russian language instruction in the country’s schools. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas emphasized that Estonia had no desire to ‘Russify’ the state’s children. In Latvia, however, other linguistic shifts have emerged. After their independence in 1990, English replaced Russian as the most common foreign language to learn. Over the past three decades, Russian has slowly phased out as younger Latvians speak English far better than Russian. Georgia has made similar shifts; starting in 2010, English was mandatory for all students, while Russian was optional. Though the new policy shift is regarded as part of Georgia’s desire to join the European Union or the desire to appeal to the current wave of English-speaking tourism, these linguistic shifts represent a more prominent change across satellite states. Throughout the Georgian countryside, among older generations from the Soviet era, many people have forgotten Russian or speak very little. Political changes have reflected the cultural view that Russia is no longer a neutral lingua franca of the region but a marker of control and occupation.
Moscow often equates linguistic affiliation to political allegiance in an increasingly complex geopolitical arena. However, the reality is more nuanced. Many former satellite states view the language as a remnant of Soviet occupation and Russian abuses. Crimea exemplifies the growing tension, especially in light of recent aggressions from Moscow. Furthermore, language does not equate to loyalty: many Russian-speaking populations abroad have opposed Russian intervention, remaining loyal to their nations. Though the Russian language remains deeply embedded in the post-Soviet landscape, its politicization oversimplifies the intricate dynamic of geopolitics. For younger generations across the Baltics, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, Russia is becoming decentralized in education, culture, and life. There is a decrease in proficiency across the youth of newly independent states, as language is no longer just a means of communication but a means of resistance. Embracing English alongside local languages reflects the rejection of the legacy of Russification and the history of imperialism. The language functions as a tool for individual and collective identity as former Soviet states attempt to break away from direct Russian control. In the former USSR states, the language represents identity, allegiance, and resistance to the legacy of the empire. Understanding the politics surrounding language is essential to understanding the region’s politics, as the future of Russian influence now hinges more on cultural and linguistic identity than on military force.