Iran After Khamenei: A Nation Split Between Sorrow and Celebration
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed on March 1, 2026 in an airstrike coordinated by the U.S. and Israel. The assassination of Khamenei has triggered a remarkably divided response within the Islamic Republic; some Iranians cheered from rooftops, while others, adorned in black, gathered to mourn the late cleric. Khamenei’s 36 years of authoritarian rule were characterized by the consolidation of absolute power in the office of supreme leader, which he used to suppress internal dissent, stoke violence in the region, and project Iranian influence abroad. In his final months, however, his priorities appeared to shift towards ensuring the survival of the regime.
The joint operation had reportedly been planned for months: the U.S. provided intelligence on Khamenei’s movements, which Israeli fighter jets used to carry out the precision strike. Khamenei’s absence has created a power vacuum, which President Trump has urged Iranians to view as an opportunity, calling it “the single greatest chance for the Iranian people to take back their country.” Iranians, however, responded in a manner that reflects the deep fissure in Iranian public opinion, split between sorrow and celebration.
Though Khamenei existed as an emblem of brutality and economic failure to many, others see his death as a martyrdom. In Iran’s theocratic republic, the supreme leader wields not only the final say in all government matters, but also exists as the highest religious authority in the world’s only sovereign Shiite state. Khamenei was regarded as a sacred symbol of Shiite power to many within Iran and around the world. Iran’s president and second highest ranking official, Masoud Pezeshkian, branded the attack as a "declaration of war against Muslims, particularly Shiites across the globe.” Many share the president’s sentiment. Thousands of mourners gathered in Tehran’s city center on March 1, 2026 chanting “death to America” and “death to Israel.” State television announced a 40-day mourning period and seven public holidays to commemorate the supreme leader.
In other neighborhoods of Tehran, a conflicting story emerged: large crowds amassed on March 1, 2026 to celebrate Khamenei’s death. Iranians cheered and danced as passing cars honked and fireworks lit up the sky. Chants of “freedom, freedom” filled the streets as people shouted from their windows. In Shiraz, a major city in south-central Iran, many abandoned their cars to join an impromptu celebration in the street, clapping, whistling, and even evoking a traditional wedding cheer that symbolizes pure joy. Similar scenes unfolded in Abdanan, Isfahan, and other cities across the country.
For those who have suffered under Khamenei’s iron-fisted rule, the news was a long-overdue means for celebration. His removal was just as cathartic for the Iranian diaspora in the U.S., made up of many who fled the theocratic regime. Throughout his reign, Iranians repeatedly protested their authoritarian government through nationwide demonstrations, all of which were suppressed with violence. Most recently, the government’s systematic killing of as many as 30,000 people during protests in early January served as a reminder of the regime’s murderous control tactics. Despite the regime’s minimal consideration for human rights, it still has a loyal base of supporters, underscoring the deep ideological, religious, and political divisions that scar Iranian society.
With adverse opinions at play, it is difficult to gauge the dominating perspective among Iranians. Based on the latest presidential and parliamentary elections, however, it is estimated that about 20 percent of voters make up a loyal base that backs the Islamic government. State-controlled media plays a significant role in reinforcing the regime’s messaging and influencing this base of supporters. This dynamic has long been evident. After the contentious reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, for example, the regime was quick to use its control over the media to cover up the killing of a peaceful protester. As millions took to the streets, footage emerged of a young woman shot dead by security forces, yet state media quickly dismissed it as fabricated propaganda.
As of now, Iran’s ruling establishment endures in Ayatollah Ali’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei. Named the new supreme leader on March 8, 2026 by Iran’s 88 member clerical body—the Assembly of Experts—Mojtaba Khamenei resembles his father in more ways than one.
Mojtaba’s installation has prompted discourse almost identical to that which surrounded his father: pro-establishment crowds celebrated the appointment as a continuation of the hard-line regime, while others have expressed concern that Mojtaba will prove to be an even more forceful leader.
It is speculated that President Trump planned for a short-term war with Iran: stripping the state of its leader and paving the way for a government that is more inclined to cooperate with the U.S., a tactic that proved relatively successful in Venezuela. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei, however, has complicated this plan and represents a continuation of Iranian defiance against the United States.
In the short term, the conflict has made regime change by civil action increasingly unlikely. The deposition of the former supreme leader and continued attacks against the Islamic Republic present a potential pivot in public priorities: Iranians may be too occupied with concerns over protecting their country to contemplate politics against the regime. Iranian security forces may also view American intervention as proof that protestors in Iran are being backed by foreign forces and gives the government an incentive to behave even more violently during future popular uprisings.
Whether the brief celebrations and newly established leadership represent the beginning of political change in Iran or merely a fleeting moment of reprieve for its people remains to be seen. One thing is for certain, Khamenei’s death has exposed the deep divisions among Iranians that lie beneath the authority of the state.