Close Calls: How China and the United States Toy with War
Image courtesy of Alessio Lin via Unsplash
On January 28, 2023, an “unidentified object” in the shape of a white sphere floated near Alaska and into American airspace. This soon presented an amusing – yet nonetheless serious –diplomatic situation when it was identified as a data-gathering balloon from China. The revelation came preceding an important visit by the Secretary of State to Beijing, threatening the goodwill between the nations as speculation ran that it was indeed a spy balloon. In an uncharacteristic turn away from wolf warrior diplomacy, China apologized for the balloon’s breach of sovereignty, claiming it was a weather balloon that veered off course. The United States shot it down as it passed over South Carolina on February 4, 2023, to the ire of the Chinese government, and has since heated the already-present tension of Secretary Blinken’s state visit.
Though this recent incident has attracted international attention and response, it pales in comparison to previous diplomatic close calls with China, many of which are comparatively recent. Especially when discussing current policy, many of these events provide better light onto China’s motives as an antagonist to U.S. interests; politically, the PRC has a much better collective memory of our history than America.
History has always been a driving force in Chinese foreign policy, and China-U.S. tensions have not historically been the most friendly nor stable. The primary cause for this is its rapid development within the Soviet sphere of influence until the Sino-Soviet split from 1956-1966, as well as its rapid expansion beyond the containing force of the Comintern. In the eyes of the American government at the time, China presented themselves as a risk of another regional hegemony that interrupted the market-infused peace after World War II. That concern reared its head both times American soldiers had weapons placed in their hands in Korea and Vietnam, as China attempted to render both developmental and military aid to the attempted communist countries that the United States opposed. In fact, it was only when China was presented with rising tensions with the Soviet Union that Mao Zedong began withdrawing support for Vietnam in an effort to enter a rapprochement with the United States.
Above all, however, Chinese foreign policy is characterized by its need to secure its sovereignty and its place as the hegemon of East Asia. The most notable diplomatic tensions in recent memory, however, are related to the United States’ interest in Taiwan, the status of which mainland China has had an extended interest. Though much of the cross-strait relationship was contained between the two entities for decades following the formation of the PRC, the transfer of the Chinese seat of the United Nations from Taiwan to mainland China signaled the rise of the People’s Republic of China as a growing world power. The United States took a vested interest in Taiwan, especially in the stability of its economic development in the face of a Chinese attempt to retake the island. Amidst the growing economy grew boiling tensions, as neither side was entirely sure of the other’s motives and equally concerned about the effects of the war that would inevitably follow any invasion.
The turning point of these tensions came in 1995 in the form of Lee Teng-hui, the then-President of Taiwan, who took what amounted to a state visit to the United States. Concerned that the United States’ interference in the “Taiwan issue” was designed to sabotage China’s international political rise, the Taiwanese military engaged in several missile tests and amphibious assault exercises in the Taiwan strait, as well as mobilizing forces in the Chinese province of Fujian.
The United States responded in a war consistent with precedent: by sending several naval craft into international waters near Taiwan, a high-speed arms race was engaged as China and the United States dared each other to take the first shot. Perhaps the only reason that this didn’t blow over into war was one fundamental truth often ignored: war is good for no one. For China – which still contends with a history pre-CCP of unequal treaties and exploitations by European powers and Japan alike – that was the one thing they could not escalate to.
Since then, diplomatic relations with China remained relatively stable, even amidst a strain as a result of increased investment in East Asia during the Obama administration. That is until a trade war was launched by the U.S. government under then-President Donald Trump against China in January 2018. This trade war, in the form of tariffs against Chinese imports designed to promote American manufacturing, was justified with claims of “unfair trade practices” by China against American imports and intellectual property. China responded with tariffs of their own, and off went a trade war that still embattles the two global powers today. Add that to developments to the conflict around Taiwan with Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island – a move that does nothing for diplomacy but anger China – and delicate balance continues to crack.
As scholars, politicians, diplomats, and service officers continue to consider how America should best approach China, it is vital not to let the bias of recency cloud decades worth of history, much of which could have resulted in more egregious and dangerous outcomes from both the U.S. and PRC. No one solution is the apparent one, nor is there one ‘right side. There is only working within the present context: the entire context. While the shooting down of a balloon in US airspace may seem like a strange straw to break the camel’s back – especially considering that most any sovereign nation would likely do the exact same –, the wreckage is merely one more thing to add to the list of disagreements waiting to boil over.
More From Our Writers
