How Erdogan Became Turkey’s Teflon Don

Over a century after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Recep Tayipp Erdogan is positioned to be one of the most powerful men in Eurasia as he approaches his third decade of rule over Türkiye. Through an increasingly troubling style of nationalistic populism and authoritarianism, Erdogan has been able to enrich himself and his allies while eroding civil liberties and democratic principles. Although Erdogan isn’t the only strongman leader taking the stage recently, he’s arguably the most successful politically. The Turkish head of state has often been compared to former world leaders Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, both of whom are currently facing potential prison time following their respective attempts at insurrection. While Erdogan represents a threat to democracy in the Anatolian peninsula, he’s still relatively popular despite economic decline and his mishandling of the earthquakes last February. The key to Erdogan's recent election victory lies in his appeal to working class Turks and the opposition’s pivot to the right wing.  

Since the 90s, Erdogan’s populist messaging has attracted a strong base of working class Turks. As someone who grew up in a poor neighborhood, Erdogan has always marketed himself as a man of the people. Erdogan once said, “My story is the story of this people. Either the people will win and come to power, or the pretentious and oppressive minority…will remain in power… Sovereignty belongs to the people.” His campaign was one that was a direct attack on the elite in Türkiye at the time. Once in power, Erdogan and his AKP (Justice and Development Party) would directly invest in key constituencies in order to build a passionate and, more importantly, a dependent voting base. This is especially relevant in the context of the recent earthquakes. Daron Acemoglu of Project Syndicate wrote, “Part of the reason why Erdoğan received so much support in earthquake zones is that he personally handed out cash, expanded government employment, and promised new houses to the victims.” This conditional monetary support and Erdogan’s “outsider” approach to politics has allowed his AKP to maintain consistent mass support among workers. Although Erdogan has claimed to be a defender of the people, the realities of his regime paint a much different picture.

Erdogan’s personalistic discourse has only served to mask an agenda that can only be described as ultra-conservative and elitist. For one, his AKP has been strongly antagonistic to organized labor. They’ve routinely defended union busting and have made it harder for workers to legally strike. This has resulted in a sharp decline in union membership and strikes since the AKP first came to power. With a weakened labor movement, wages in Türkiye have remained stagnant while cost of living has increased and working conditions have worsened. Meanwhile, Erdogan has made a fortune by protecting the interests of business and foreign investment. Turkish political scientists S. Erdem Aytaç and Ziya Őniş wrote that “the AKP governments dismantled administrative barriers to investment, reduced the corporate tax rate, and improved the overall legal protection of foreign investors.” Erdogan rapidly sold off much of Türkiye’s public sector as well, leading to widespread corruption and nepotism amongst his AKP. Erin O Brien of Jacobin wrote, “This privatization of government contracts has become a key means of enriching individuals and companies close to Erdoğan and his inner circle.” These pro-capital policies have in turn made Türkiye one of the most unequal countries in the world according to the Gini index (.415). In this way, Erdogan’s proletariat sympathies only exist at the speech level. 

Instead of proposing a genuine left-wing counter to the AKP’s cronyism, Erdogan’s main opponent, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, ignored economic reform and opted to use migrants as a scapegoat during the runoff. Leading up to the 2023 election, Kilicdaroglu was actually favored to unseat Erdogan. As the incumbent, Erdogan was facing numerous economic crises, a disastrous earthquake, and sinking public approval. Polls only two months before the election show Kilicidaroglu leading the Turkish president by over 10 points and the AKP trailing the opposition bloc by at least six points. Therefore, it’s not enough to simply look at Erdogan’s institutional strength as an explanation for his continued dominance in Türkiye. Rather, it’s important to add that the AKP’s opposition was deeply flawed as well and failed to address the issues at the heart of Erdogan’s regime. While Kilicidaroglu has taken shots at “savage capitalism” in the past, his platform seems to have now fallen in line with traditional economic dogma. Halil Karaveli, a senior fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, observed that “Kilicdaroglu has refrained from pushing for economic redistribution and for the restoration of labor rights…instead, what Kilicdaroglu appears to be offering is a restoration in all but name of the original AKP, which, like the opposition alliance he leads, was an alliance of free-market conservatives.” As a result, ordinary Turks were essentially forced to choose between two politicians who were already firmly in the pockets of big business. After a disappointing result in the first round of elections, Kilicdaroglu fell to the right on the Syrian refugee crisis as well. Less than two weeks before the runoff election, Kilicdaroglu posted a video on Twitter declaring, “We will not abandon our homeland to this mentality that allowed 10 million irregular migrants to come among us.” While this nationalistic dog-whistling is expected from a staunch conservative like Erdogan, who has in fact significantly cracked down on Syrian refugees, it comes off as desperate from an opposing candidate like Kilicdaroglu. By conceding to conservatives on economic and migrant issues, Kilicdaroglu and his coalition failed in preventing Erdogan’s reelection and the AKP’s continued dominance in Türkiye.

Following his election victory in May, Erdogan will be serving another five year term in his to-be 30 year long reign in Türkiye. In this time, he has transformed Türkiye from a parliamentary system to a presidential one with himself as leader, heavily curtailed civil liberties, and has effectively turned the Turkish economy into a money-making machine for himself and his allies. Although it may satisfy some to point to Türkiye’s strict censorship or corruption as reasons for Kilicdaroglu’s defeat, we must also look at the failures of capitalism and xenophobia. Türkiye’s democratic backsliding very well could have been halted by embracing workers instead of pandering to nationalists. Despite this setback, there may still be hope. This election cycle saw the AKP at its weakest and most unpopular point in years. On top of that, Erdogan’s strongman brand of conservatism has been on the decline globally, as we’ve seen with the defeats of Trump and Bolsonaro in the Americas. Only time can tell if the Turkish left could effectively utilize this moment and learn from the mistakes of the past.