Exclusion, Repression, and Confusion: President Bukele’s Failure to Address Organized Crime in El Salvador

In March 2022, the President of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, detained over 55,000 Salvadorans in the largest sweep of arrests in the country’s history. The crackdown came hours after the Legislative Assembly authorized the President’s proposal for a Régimen de Excepción (State of Emergency) that had relieved the state from needing due process to make arrests. For weeks, the Salvadoran police targeted impoverished neighborhoods to arrest citizens with both alleged and actual associations with gangs. The influx of detainees led to mass life sentences being issued in courts where, in some cases, over 300 defendants were sentenced at once. Most of the accused were sent to CECOT: a mega prison where inmates are crammed together in large cells without access to phones, parol resources, or even sunlight. Cristosal, a Salvadoran non-governmental organization, has since cited at least 261 inmate deaths in CECOT due to abuse, torture, or a lack of medical attention.

Despite international criticism, President Bukele’s approval rating hovers between 80 and 90 percent. Even with suppressing access to information, the self-proclaimed “world’s coolest dictator” is lauded by his people for making them feel safe in their own neighborhoods. However, President Bukele’s approval rating conceals his administration’s ignorance of past and future rural life in El Salvador. While President Bukele’s crackdown has provided short term success, his actions ignore El Salvador’s history of war and violence that motivates gang participation in the first place.  Bukele’s mano dura (firm hand) policies have undermined impoverished communities more than they have helped them. Additionally, President Bukele’s centralization of state power has contributed to a democratic backsliding in El Salvador that exacerbates the class divide between industry elites and the rural population.

President Bukele’s policies overlook historic economic inequities which triggered the Salvadoran Civil War and have since devastated communities afterwards.  Specifically, throughout the 20th century, Salvadoran oligarchs exploited the law to purchase “titles” for territories which were under communal land ownership.  By 1970, the average acreage for rural households had shrunk exponentially to 0.4 hectares compared to 7.4 hectares in 1899. These land inequalities motivated the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FLMN), a former guerilla group, to rebel against the state in the Salvadoran Civil War. Between 1980-1984, over 40,000 Salvadoran citizens died to government death squads who committed egregious “scorched earth” operations in communities suspected of rebel sympathies. After the rebel groups agreed to a ceasefire in 1984, however, they negotiated the 1992 Chapultepec Accords with the Salvadoran government.  The FMLN demobilized and became a new political party in exchange for the government committing to land redistribution and democratization.  Peace, in actuality, led to meager changes. Politically dominant, El Salvador’s conservative ARENA party routinely passed postwar policies that kept the pre-war economic hegemony intact. For instance, the National Assembly’s 1993 Wartime Amnesty Law granted legal immunity to all parties in the Civil War, eliminating the possibility of reparations for victims of state terror. As a result, crime rose in the 1990s and 2000s due to the people’s sustained lack of opportunities and resentment toward the “weak laws” of the National Assembly. Hence, President Bukele’s crackdown overlooks the class disparities in El Salvador which have caused and persisted beyond the Civil War.

Furthermore, President Bukele’s mano dura policies have exacerbated the conditions of vulnerable communities. Mano dura, in fact, has a history of failure. In 2015, the Salvadoran government launched a similar wave of mass arrests. Gangs responded by relocating to impoverished communities which were less protected by the police and sustained their practice of extortion through underground channels. Bukele’s iteration of mano dura has had more success in declining gang activity, but his policies have also created new tragedies for an already scarred country. In particular, Cristosal, a Salvadoran human rights organization, has documented over 500 cases of arbitrary arrests, and 73 detainees of CECOT have died in custody. After the mano dura, El Salvador now has the world’s largest prison population and lacks rehabilitative systems to reintegrate the penalized into their former communities. Moreover, those who were accused of “unlawful association” with gangs are now no longer capable of contributing to the economic wellbeing of their families, increasing the risk factor of their relatives resorting to criminal activity or emigrating. Though gang violence may have been reduced in El Salvador, Bukele’s measures have damaged poor communities by detaining sizable portions of their young, working population.

Finally, President Bukele’s recent measures to centralize his judicial power and silence dissenters is representative of a democratic backsliding that further alienates rural Savaldorans. In August 2021, President Bukele expelled judges suspected of “corruption” and replaced them with 168 loyalists. With this control of the judiciary, President Bukele passed a law against journalists who “transmit messages… presumably originating from gangs” which could “generate anxiety and panic.” Hence, the Bukele administration empowered itself to expel several journalists who were critical of his war on gangs by claiming they were gang sympathizers. Together, these efforts to consolidate the judiciary and suppress dissent reinforces the economic power of corporations in the commercial and manufacturing sectors. Since the end of the Civil War, the majority of economically viable industries in El Salvador have been dominated by these protected multinational corporations which have limited the prevalence and diversity of opportunities for Salvadoran citizens. The privatization of capital by multinational corporations has excluded the rural population from the economy and leaves lower class Salvadorans with two options: emigrate to the United States or join gangs. The model of top-down extraction that has persisted throughout El Salvador’s history as a state is strengthened through the exclusion of certain voices in the democratic processes. The consolidation of Bukele loyalists in government and the expansion of police suppression have had a synergistic effect of protecting the rich and alienating the poor. 

There are alternative policies to President Bukele’s crackdown which could better serve Salvadorans. Principally, the government could establish restorative justice programs for lower-tiered criminals, such as sentencing them to complete community service in the communities which are most impacted by their crimes. Secondly, El Salvador could reinstate income taxes on foreign investors and reinvest the proceeds into welfare programs or local businesses which diversify economic opportunities. Thirdly, El Salvador could adopt community policing initiatives which can improve the state’s relationship with impoverished neighborhoods. If individuals and businesses believe the state is protecting (rather than suppressing) opportunity, then individuals would participate in gangs less and more inclined to share info needed to stop gangs.  Finally, El Salvador could ensure that the perpetrators of the Civil War pay corrective reparations to the people who were most directly damaged by it. It is estimated that around $10-35k are needed to adequately compensate survivors or the relatives of the victims of state violence who still suffer from its systemic consequences.

President Bukele’s crackdown has paradoxically harmed the communities which are most affected by gang violence. By using the pretext of gangs to consolidate power, President Bukele has suppressed several civil rights of Salvadorans who may otherwise offer criticism or alternative solutions to the crises of organized crime. Fundamentally, President Bukele has ignored the historical inequities which motivate gang participation while simultaneously widening the divide between poor rural and wealthy urban communities.