Collective Memory and Ethnic Nationalism’s Impact on Japanese Foreign Policy
The end of the Second World War left East Asia decimated and in shambles. Amidst all the destruction and rubble lay an exciting opportunity for the region’s future, with the West holding complete control over reconstruction and creating states. However, the focus on rebuilding after the war pushed off discussions of Japanese wartime accountability until much later, leaving disputes on sexual slavery and honoring dead soldiers unresolved. As time went on, this conflicting narrative on Japan’s role as an aggressor and victim in the war became known as the “history problem,” often acting as the point of contention reducing trust between Japan and its neighbors, more specifically Korea. As Japan navigates an increasingly multipolar world, the nation stands to gain much from the mutual economic and security interests it shares with its Korean neighbor. However, the resurgence of ethnic nationalism, triggered primarily by the failure to resolve the history problem, remains independent of cooperation and continues to drive foreign policy, presenting an unapologetic and damaging historical stance.
Understanding the history problem and its relational impacts requires understanding what creates a national identity, the mechanisms of collective memory, and the origins and impacts of points of contention. For historical context, the initial idea of a Japanese empire emerged in 1868, when the Meiji Restoration overthrew the feudal system, replacing regional lords with a single reigning emperor. Combined with the prominence of Shinto faith and a rising belief in Japanese superiority, the state focused on establishing an ethnic identity—Kokutai. Nationalism, understood as an identity built around a state’s government, took a preliminary form in this context. It viewed citizens as extensions of the state and emphasized ethnic homogeneity under the emperor, a concept known as Minzoku. There, a conscious identity centered around the political state resulted in more leverage from the state, rapidly industrializing and becoming a regional power. Since the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese Empire underwent three significant changes in the ideology of nationalism, varying between democratic and authoritarian. Notably, the principle of Kokutai, or national polity, dominated Japan’s nationalism up until the Second World War, driving colonization in Korea and Taiwan and state-driven industrialization. When Japan’s acts of aggression were curbed following defeat in the war, the U.S. established a westernized democratic system in Japan through the 1947 Postwar Constitution and the dismantlement of the Shinto State.
Despite numerous changes to the types of nationalisms Japan experienced, sensitivity to admitting wrongdoing as a result of the Shinto faith and long-standing ideas of Japanese superiority led to resistance in reconciliation of wartime atrocities. An explanation that incorporates ethnicity and Shinto is one that revolves around culture, where collective memory is shaped by floating cultural elements such as literature and media. As such, memory builds upon itself, becoming a fluid process shaped by norms, institutions, and political culture. Japanese postwar identity is characterized as impenitent and fragmented, lacking institutionalized acceptance and reconciliation of wartime guilt.
In successful reconciliation, Japan must sufficiently apologize to the victims of its colonial and wartime aggression. However, that remains difficult as Japan’s national self-image is caught between being a violent aggressor and colonizer as well as a victim of nuclear destruction. As such, Japan’s role in apologizing becomes complex, especially as each victim has different definitions of “sufficient”. In the Korean case, numerous attempts were made to resolve the wartime atrocities. Most notably, the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea not only created formal diplomatic ties but also provided Korea with a $300 million grant to compensate Korean victims of the war. Subsequently, Article II of the treaty also states that “claims [between both peoples and states] have been settled completely and finally,” implying that Japan has sufficiently apologized and compensated the Korean victims.
As a country focused on economic development at the time, Korea was satisfied with the monetary compensation. However, as Korea grew richer and its citizens began caring about political issues, disagreements with the Japanese began again, specifically regarding comfort women. The comfort women were sex slaves of the Japanese Army during World War II, where women, mainly from Korea but also from China, were forced into sexual servitude. For Korea, the idea of its women being subjected to sexual slavery has been one of embarrassment, as it demonstrates submission in colonial oppression, gendered violence, and injustice. Although the Kono statement in 1993 recognized military responsibility and expressed remorse, subsequent political statements, such as those made by conservatives Abe and his current successor Takaichi, question the facts of the accepted narrative and the extent of Japan’s responsibility. The conservatives shifted the blame, stating that many of the women were prostitutes who recruited young women into the practice, and that the sexual servitude was imposed on themselves. These statements outraged Koreans and Chinese, fueling skepticism about Japan’s sincerity. Korean disputes with the Japanese continue over demands for corporate liability and compensation under the law, a formal and official apology, as well as memorialization efforts. For Koreans, comfort women remain emotionally an charged subject, as they bring forth shame and trauma faced by individuals and as a nation.
The rollback of acknowledging wartime atrocities is best reflected through the actions of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose “Take Back Japan” campaign seeks to transport Japan back to a romanticized version of the pre-war past, stopping the nation from being stuck apologizing for historical problems. Shinzo Abe’s rhetoric in the “Take Back Japan” political platform exemplifies a resurgence of pre-war nationalism as it mobilizes the populace in celebrating a unified Japanese ethnic identity and portrays China and Korea’s tensions as threatening. Abe’s creation of “us” vs “them” narratives framed Japan as proud people defending their status in an unstable post-war regime, while its neighbors as victims unable to move on from the past.
From a regional standpoint, Japanese nationalism can be seen as both a symptom of internal uncertainty around identity and a potential barrier to constructive relations with Korea. Nationalism emerges as a reaction to feelings of external moral shaming from Korea and Japanese domestic politics’ inability to decide on a postwar identity. Consequently, reactive nationalism out of this fear jeopardizes Japan’s long-term strategic interests, as it heightens regional mistrust and damages Japan’s image as a responsible leader. The resurgence of patriotic education, historical revisionism, and assertive rhetoric toward neighboring states alienates them over time, even though economic interdependence deepens. Ultimately, Japan’s failure to align its identity with the historical expectations of its neighbors results in the “identity dissonance” that fuels regional frictions.