Pakistan: Judas of the American Alliance
Image courtesy of Syed Bilal Javaid on Unsplash
The September 11 attacks caught the United States off guard, resulting in a massive debate among the United States government on how and if the attack could’ve been prevented. Many Americans criticized the U.S. government’s support for the Afghan Mujahideen fighters in the 1980s in their fight against the Soviet Union as some of these fighters would go on to form Al-Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible for the attack, and the Taliban, the terrorist group who sheltered them at the time and rules Afghanistan today.
But what is often left out is the role played in forming Al-Qaeda by Pakistan, America’s intermediary and supposed ally in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s government has long sought to foster the growth of radical Islamist groups in Afghanistan. It has been the primary backer of the Taliban from their creation to the present day and was also accused of sheltering Al-Qaeda after the attacks occurred. After all, U.S. special forces killed Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden not in Afghanistan, but in a mansion in Pakistan.
Despite evidence that the U.S. knew of Pakistan’s intentions for years before the attacks, the U.S. continued to strategically cooperate with Pakistan and took a relatively soft-handed approach to dealing with their Taliban partners. Even after 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan remained a strategic partner despite their clear support for the Taliban. Even today, Pakistan enjoys special status within America’s partners as a “Major Non-NATO Ally”, even after their sabotage of America’s 20-year mission in Afghanistan.
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent outset of the Mujahideen insurgency, the United States attempted to utilize the situation to its advantage. Reeling from their disastrous failure after roughly 20 years of fighting in Vietnam in which their adversary was supported by the Soviet Union, the United States wanted to strike back. Specifically, it wanted to give the Soviets their own Vietnam.
Therefore, in 1979, the Carter administration initiated Operation Cyclone. This operation would eventually grow into a multi-billion dollar effort to supply the Mujahideen rebels with arms and equipment which would force the occupying Soviet forces to fight a drawn-out counterinsurgency for over a decade. But to ensure plaU.S.ible deniability to the Soviet Union, all resources were to be passed to Pakistan first and then distributed to the rebels.
The Mujahideen were a loose coalition of armed groups opposing the Soviet-backed Afghan government and were in no way united, consisting of hardline Sunni Islamists, Islamic democrats, Shia Islamists, and even other communists. Regardless of who they were, the United States was eager to support the rebels so long as, according to national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, it gave the Soviets their own Vietnam.
Many of the Mujahideen groups launched their operations from neighboring Pakistan, who had granted them a safe haven. At the time, Pakistan was led by military dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who had come to power in a coup in 1977. Since its independence, Pakistan’s military and intelligence had been concerned with countering India in the disputed Kashmir region and therefore sought to maintain a cooperative regime in Afghanistan so as not to draw attention from the frozen conflict in Kashmir.
Al-Haq had used Islamism as a way to garner popular support and his government was under constant pressure from hardliners to be more Islamic. And with the Arab monarchies wanting to fund a jihad in Afghanistan to counter Iranian influence, Pakistan was in a perfect place to expand its influence. Communist Afghanistan was of particular importance given India’s close relationship with the communist bloc.
Pakistan began its plan by training thousands of Afghan refugee boys in hardline Islamism and combat in religious schools known as Madrasas. They also required any aid provided to the rebels to be distributed through officially recognized political parties in which the hardliners received the lion's share.
Once America became heavily involved in supporting the Mujahideen, Pakistan became the middleman. Throughout the 1980s, millions of dollars worth of weapons and other equipment poured into Pakistan for distribution in Afghanistan, yet giving Pakistan control over its distribution meant it was going straight to the hardliners and greatly expanding its power. Foreign Islamist fighters also poured into the region to assist in the jihad against the Soviets. One of these fighters was the son of a wealthy Saudi businessman, Osama Bin Laden.
When the Taliban emerged in 1994 as the most hardline faction yet, Pakistan began supporting them using Pakistani funds, the Taliban were easily able to take over most of the country by absorbing the other hardliners and negotiating the surrender of cities via bribes. In 1997, the Taliban took Kabul and forced the Islamic democrats into the northern corner of the country. With the war stalemated, the Taliban began to consolidate their control, passing strict Islamic laws and prompting the return of Bin Laden, who had recently been expelled from Sudan.
That year, the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan sent a cable to the State Department regarding the situation. They first mention that Pakistan remains committed to a Taliban victory. The Embassy team admits that current engagement efforts with the Taliban have failed to moderate their policies or get them to expel Bin Laden, they also mention that the Taliban have opened training camps for Kashmir-based Islamist militias which is potentially a move by Pakistan to combat India.
The cable pushes for a policy of “restrained engagement” with the Taliban government. This meant that by engaging with the Taliban and further integrating them into the international community such as opening dialogue with regional partners, they could push the Taliban to moderate their policies and expel Bin Laden. As for their policy towards Pakistan, the Embassy only suggests reminding Pakistan of the economic costs of a civil war on their borders and not applying any external pressure on them.
The war would continue to stalemate for the next three years with the Taliban continuing to receive massive support from Pakistan and the democrats, now called the Northern Alliance, receiving some support from India, Iran and Russia. Meanwhile, the U.S. was aware of the terrorist threat. In 1993, Al-Qaeda-trained terrorists bombed the World Trade Center in an eerie prelude to future attacks. Despite this, the U.S. continued its policy of engagement with the Taliban, hosting Taliban delegations in the U.S. and sparing Pakistan any significant consequences.
In 1998, in response to Al-Qaeda bombings at two U.S. embassies, killing hundreds of Americans, the U.S. launched cruise missiles into Afghanistan, targeting Al-Qaeda training camps in an attempt to kill Bin Laden. Since the operation would be carried out over Pakistani airspace, the U.S. informed Pakistan of the operation who, multiple sources claimed, including Bin Laden himself, passed the information on to him. This allowed Bin Laden to evacuate before the missiles hit.
A September 2000 cable from the State Department mentions how serious Pakistan’s support for the Taliban had become. Pakistan now provided the Taliban with “material, fuel, funding, technical assistance, and military advisors.” as well as allowing thousands of Pakistanis to serve in the ranks of the Taliban. Despite this, the cable still only recommends finger-wagging when it came to engaging with Pakistan and reiterated that the U.S. would not support the Northern Alliance.
Less than one year later, Al-Qaeda committed the 9/11 attacks, killing nearly 3000 Americans. The U.S. would respond by invading Afghanistan, driving the Taliban from power. According to some credible sources, the Pakistan Air Force secretly evacuated top Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders from the Afghan city of Kunduz ahead of the advancing American and Northern Alliance forces. Regardless, many high-ranking terrorist leaders such as Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Bin Laden fled to Pakistan following the invasion.
In 2004, the U.S. government “9/11 Commission” released a report on the circumstances surrounding the attacks. In the second chapter of the report book, they report on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda’s rise to power. The chapter mentions that in 1998, while based in Afghanistan, Bin Laden issued a “Fatwa”, or a supposed interpretation of Islamic law, calling for attacks against the United States. The report places the blame for Bin Laden’s actions squarely on Pakistan, noting that Pakistani intelligence first introduced Bin Laden to the Taliban.
The document was worded in a way that implied that the government recognized now that Pakistan had been a bigger problem in the region and that perhaps they had been too lenient when dealing with them and their Taliban partners.
Unfortunately, neither Pakistan nor the U.S. dramatically changed their policy. Shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan began, the U.S. eased unrelated sanctions against Pakistan. Over the next decade, the U.S. provided Pakistan with over 20 billion dollars in military aid. All while Pakistan continued to support the Taliban in their fight against American forces. Pakistan provided the Taliban a safe haven to launch attacks from as well as continued their material, financial, logistical, and training support for the Taliban. Pakistani hospitals were even U.S.ed to treat wounded Taliban fighters. Top U.S. officials knew about this support but policy towards Pakistan barely changed, even as the Taliban regained control of most of the country following the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021.
Even now, as the Taliban rule over the country and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda enjoy unprecedented freedom within the country, Pakistan remains a Major Non-Nato Ally of the U.S., and deep military and economic ties remain. All of this is occurring while America’s former Northern Alliance allies are ignored even as they continue to fight the Taliban alone.
The United States initially relied on Pakistan as a partner for accomplishing its strategic objectives in the 1980s, but a pattern emerged, showing that Pakistan preferred more radical Islamist groups to hold power. Once the war ended, Pakistan stepped up its support for terrorists intent on attacking the U.S., yet America continued to engage with these groups and refused to punish Pakistan for supporting them. Although all the signs were there that Pakistan was double-crossing the U.S., no significant action was taken and Pakistan remained a strategic partner.
Today, the pattern continues. The U.S. continues to treat Pakistan as a close ally even as Pakistan provides support to the Taliban’s new government. The Taliban continue to hoU.S.e international terrorist groups, some, such as Al-Qaeda are now able to rebuild after decades of being hunted by the U.S.. The U.S. is once again in a position in which it is ignoring an active threat from an ally and once again, the U.S. must change its tactics before it is too late.
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